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NOTE AND COMMENT
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
It is now possible to sue the United States in tort actions
without a special authorization from Congress. A judicial
remedy has been provided to take the place of the political
remedy that has been used for handling tort claims against the
Government. The Congress found that it was necessary to
streamline their work in order to keep up with the ever in-
creasing demand on its time for more important legislative
tasks and therefore it was necessary to find some other means
of handling the less important details that have proven haras-
sing and time-consuming and that could be shifted to other
bodies or agencies for disposal. The result was the "Legisla-
tive Reorganization Act of 1946." Title IV of this act is
known as the "Federal Tort Claims Act. ' "
Very briefly, the Federal Tort Claims Act fixes the liabil-
ity of the United States for torts resulting from the negligent
or unlawful acts or omissions of its officers or employees and
provides two remedies. One remedy is by administrative
action and the other is in the form of consent by the United
States to be sued in the Federal District Courts on such claims.
In the field of tort, the Federal Government, as well as
any sovereign, was not only immune from suit,' but there was
no liability by the rules of law applicable to the sovereign.!
Unless it has assumed such liability by legislative enactment,
the rule is well settled that the Government is not liable for
injuries arising from the negligent or other tortious acts or
conduct of its officers, agents or servants, committed in the
performance of their duties.' In other words, unless Congress
assumes such liability voluntarily, the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior does not apply to the United States,' and the same is true
of any sovereign.
quired by statute to perform the duty being performed by the sub-
ordinate, or unless the official cooperates in the negligence or is negli-
gent in appointing such subordinates. See Robertson v. Sichel (1888)
127 U.S. 507, 8 S. Ct. 1286; Vance v. Hale (1928) 156 Tenn. 389, 2 S.W.
(2d) 94. See 12 Ann. Cas. 185; 22 R.C.L. 487.
Administrative officials may use the declaratory judgment procedure
to clarify their duties and legal relations. See Borchard, Judical Re-
lief for Imsecurity, 33 Cor. L. Ray. 649 (1933) ; Borchard, Judicial Re-
lief for Peril and Iusecurity, 45 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1932).
'60 Stat. 842-847 (1946), 28 U.S.C.A. 921-946.
'Minnesota v. United States (1938) 305 U.S. 382,59 S.Ct. 292, 83 L.Ed.
235; Hill v. United States (1860) 9 How. (U.S.) 386, 13 L.Ed. 185.
'Gibbons v. United States (1869) 75 U.S. 269, 19 L.Ed. 543.
'Hill v. United States, supra note 2; Robertson v. Sichel 127 U.S. 507,
8 S.Ct. 1288, 32 L.Ed. 203.
'Mills v. Stewart (1926) 76 Mont. 429, 247 P. 332, 47 A..R. 424; Lewis
v. State (1884) 96 N.Y. 71.
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The rule is well established that by consenting to be sued,
the state or nation does nothing more than waive its immunity
from action.' It does not thereby concede its liability in favor
of the claimant7 or create a cause of action in his favor that did
not therefore exist.! Thus the fact that the state has given a gen-
eral consent to be sued by those having claims against it, is
not a basis for assuming that the state has accepted liability
equal to that of an individual in the same circumstances.' Nei-
ther does a special statute permitting suits on particular claims
concede the justice of the claims.8 Statutory consent to be sued
only provides another remedy than an appeal to the legislature,
and submits the state to the jurisdiction of the court, subject
to its right to interpose any lawful defense, which in the case of
torts would be the absence of liability of the sovereign for the
torts of its officers or agents committed in the performance of
their duties. The same rule of immunity applies to both the
state and the United States.'
The state of Washington has a statute waiving its immun-
ity from suit." The statute provides that "any person or
corporation having any action or claim against the State of
Washington shall have a right to bring an action against the
state in the superior court of Thurston County." In construing
this law in the case of Riddoch v. State," the Washington court
said, "It creates no cause of action. It provides a remedy
for existing causes but imposes no new liability. It does not
waive any defense." In a long line of decisions, the United
States Supreme Court denies liability of the United States in
actions in tort based on the negligence or tortious acts or conduct
of its officers or employees, and does not base the absence of
liability on the ground that no remedy has been provided, the
principle being that the exemption is based on absence of obliga-
tion and not mere absence of remedy."
'Davis v. State (1917) 30 Idaho 137, 163 P. 373, Ann. Cas. 1918D 911;
Lewis v. State (1922) 234 N.Y. 578, 138 N.E. 457; Smith v. State
(1920) 227 N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841, 13 A.L.R. 1264.
'Green v. State (1889) 73 Cal. 29, 11 P. 602; Commonwealth v. Stevens
(1881) 3 Ky. L. Rep. 165; Lewis v. State Supra note 6; Apfelbacher v.
State (1918) 167 Wis. 233, 167 N.W. 244.
'Smith v. State supra.
'Barnett v. State (1917) 220 N.Y. 423, 116 N.E. 99, L.R.A. 1918C 400.
"Smith v. State supra.
"United States v. Lee (1882) 106 U.S. 196.
"Rem. Rev. Stat. Wash. (1931) §886.
''(1912) 86 Wash. 329, 123 P. 450, Ann. Cas. 1913E 1033.
"Belknap v. Schild (1895) 161 U.S. 10, 16. S.Ct. 443, 40 L.Ed. 599; Ger-
man Bank v. United States (1892) 148 U.S. 573, 13 S.Ct. 702, 37 L.
Ed. 564.
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 8 [1947], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol8/iss1/3
NOTE AND COMMENT
In Bourn v. Hart,' the California court said, "The exemption
of the state from paying damages for accidents of this nature
does not depend on its immunity from being sued without its
consent, but rests upon the grounds of public policy which deny
its liability for such damages."
In Mills v. Stewart,' the Montana court said, "But the
state is a public corporation and out of consideration of public
policy the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to it
unless assumed voluntarily. In other words, the state is not
liable for the negligent acts of its agents unless through the legis-
lative department of government it assumes such liability.
While there is at least one case to the contrary," the gen-
eral rule is that the exemption of the state from liability for the
torts of its officers and agents does not depend upon the state's
immunity from suit without its consent," but rests upon the
grounds of public policy which deny the liability of the state
for such damages.' It is a result of the sovereign character of
the state and the absence of liability does not rest upon its im-
munity from suit."
The above rule is recognized and the liability of the United
States is fixed in the Federal Tort Claims Act in the following
words: "Subject to the provisions of this title, the United
States shall be liable in respect of such claims to the same claim-
ants, in the same manner, and to the same extent as a private
individual under the same circumstances . . ." Thus by legisla-
tive enactment, the United States has accepted liability for
damages on account of personal injury or property damage re-
sulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
of its employees. - This is plain and simple and there should be
no question of the assumption of liability.
The Federal Tort Claims Act gives the consent of the
government to be sued on any claim "on account of damage to
or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for
such damage, loss, injury, or death in accordance with the law
"(1892) 93 Cal. 321, 28 P. 951.
'Supra note 5.
"Sandel v. State (1920) 115 B.C. 168, 104 S.E. 567, 13 A.L.R. 1268.
"sAs to the necessity of consent, see infra note 22.
"Bourn v. Hart, supra note 15.
"Smith v. State supra; Ridoch v. State supra; Anno. Ann. Cas. 1913E
1039.
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of the place where the act or omission occurred." This consent
is necessary to any remedy against the United States through
the courts." As a matter of sovereignty, the United States can-
not be sued in any of its courts or in any other court by any
individual association or state without its consent." It is not an
attribute of sovereignty peculiar to the United States but has
been the very essence of sovereignty from the earliest time. If
a government is to survive, it must protect itself, not only from
foreign states, but also from its own subjects and citizens. If
a government, amenable to suit at the will of subjects or others,
it will find itself subject instead of potentate.
The sovereign prerogative of immunity from suit is one of
the earliest principles of law. In Blackstone's Commentaries is
found the following statement quoted from Puffendorf who
preceded Blackstone: "A subject, so long as he continues a
subject, hath no way to oblige his prince to give him his due
when he refuse it." Not verbose, but still the meaning is
clear. Immunity of the sovereign.
Lord Coke reports that while he was at the bar it was re-
solved by all the judges that at common law in order to sue the
King, he who had the right must resort to a petition of right."
The petition of right is nothing more nor less than the consent
of the King for a subject to bring an action against the gov-
ernment.
While the sovereign may not be sued without its consent,
it is also important that the consent be properly given by that
part of the government having the power to grant such right."
In the case of the English petition of right, it must come di-
rectly from the Crown through the Secretary of State for the
Home Department." In the United States the authorization
must come by enactment of Congress' in the regular manner.
A bill must be passed by both branches of Congress and be
signed by the President before it is a valid waiver of the sov-
ereign prerogative of immunity from suit.
It is worthy of note that the petition of right does not is-
sue in all cases but only in certain classes of cases. It is very
'aHill v. United States supra; United States v. Clarke (1834) 33 U.S.
436.
"Minnesota v. United States supra; Briggs v. The Light Boats (1885)
11 Allen 162.
"Biackstone's Commentaries Vol. 1, p. 243.
"Sadler's Case 4 Co. 54b, 55a.
" Carr v. United States (1878) 98 U.S. 433, 25 L.Ed. 209.
"Petition of Right Act (1880) 22 & 24 Vic. c. 34.
"Carr v. United States supra.
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closely akin to the Tucker Act in the United States in this
respect. The scope of the petition of right is. well stated in
Feather v. Regina," where Cockburn, C. J. says:
"The only cases in which the petition of right is open to
the subject are, where the lands or goods or money of a
subject have found their way into the possession of the
crown, and the purpose of the petition is to obtain resti-
tution, or, if restitution cannot be given, compensation
in money, or where the claim arises out of a contract,
as for goods supplied to the Crown or for public service.
It is in such cases only that the instances of petitions of
right having been entertained are to be found in our
books."
And to the same effect a statement by Earle, C. J. in Tobin
v. Regina:"
"A petition of right will not lie to recover compensa-
tion for a wrongful act done by a servant of the Crown in
the supposed performance of his duty, nor will it lie to
recover unliquidated damages for a trespass.
Thus it appears that the petition of right does not furnish
a consent of the Crown to be sued in tort actions, just as the
Tucker Act excludes actions in cases "sounding in tort."
In the United States, Congress has been very careful in
passing legislation giving consent of the government to be
sued and that consent once given is strictly construed." It is
not within the power of the courts to allow suits against the
government in the absence of proper consent from Congress.
Justice Miller stated it very clearly in Gibbons v. United
States," saying: "Where it is proper for the nation to furnish
a remedy, Congress has wisely reserved the matter for its
own determination. It certainly has not conferred it on the
Court of Claims."
The Court of Claims was created in 1855" to handle
claims against the government in contract cases and a few
unimportant exceptions. The jurisdiction of the court was
amended and revised by the Tucker Act of March 3, 1887."
eact of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, 28 U.S.C.A. 250, 28 U.S.C.A. 41 (20).
"(1865) 6 B. & S. 257, 35 LJ.Q.B. 200, 12 L.T. 114, 2D P. J. 709, 122
E.R. 1191.
-(1864) 16 C.B.N.S. 810, 4 New Rep. 274, 33 L.J.C.P. 199, 10 L.T. 762,
10 Jur. N.S. 1029, 12 W.R. 838. 2 Mar. L C. 45, 143 E.R. 1148.
"United States v. Sherwood (1940) 312 U.S. 584, 61 S.Ct. 7M7, 85 L.Hd.
1058.
*Supra note 3.
"Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. at 1& 612.
"Supra note 28.
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The Tucker Act is the consent of the government to be sued
in four distinct classes of cases. They are: (1) cases founded
upon the Constitution or any law of Congress, with the excep-
tion of pension cases; (2) cases founded upon a regulation of
the executive department; (3) cases of contract express or im-
plied with the Government; (4) actions for damages liquidated
or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort.
Attempts have been made to bring tort actions against the
United States under the Tucker Act by treating them as cases
of implied contract, but the decisions are uniform in their con-
demnation of this practice" and it was stated in Gibbons v.
United States:'
"But it is not to be disguised that this case is an attempt,
under the assumption of an implied contract, to make the
government responsible for the unauthorized acts of its of-
ficer, those acts being in themselves torts. No government
has ever held itself liable to individuals for the misfeasance,
laches or unauthorized exercise of power by its officers and
agents. "
This is stated in terms of liability of the Government, but
in the same case Justice Miller also made the distinction in terms
of remedy, as stated above.
Also, it has been attempted to bring a case under the Tucker
Act by "waiving the tort and suing in implied contract."' This
has also been held improper. The court admits that if the case
has the elements of both contract and tort the party may for-
bear to sue in .tort and bring an action on the contract," but
repeats with emphasis that "a right of action in contract can-
not be created by waiving a tort, and the duty to pay damages
for a tort does not imply a promise to pay them, upon which
assumpsit can be maintained.'
There have been other acts of Congress which have in ef-
fect granted the consent of the United States to be sued,' and
some of the classes of cases covered have been torts. They
have been the torts that have resulted from some particular
operation of the Government or some special field in which
"Bigby v. United States (1902) 188 U.S. 400, 23 S.Ct. 468, 47 L.Ed. 519;
Hill v. United States supra; Gibbons v. United States supra; Cooper v.
Cooper (1888) 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892.
"Supra note 3.
"Cooper v. Cooper supra; Bigby v. United States supra.
"Cooper v. Cooper supra.
"Cooper v. Cooper supra.
'054 Am. Jur. United States §133.
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it is engaged." This is the first time that there has been a
general consent of the Government to be sued in tort cases,
and the first time that the Government has assumed liability
for torts of its employees generally.
Prior to the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the
remedy for torts of employees of the Government committed
in the scope of their employment was by private claim bills
brought in the Congress." There were hundreds of these
claims sought each year, and since the remedy was entirely
political, it is doubtful if there is any relation between the
number of bills brought up and the number of claims of merit
that arose. Also, only about 20 per cent of those sought were
ever finally approved. Besides being a tremendous burden on
the legislative department, it was at best a poor substitute for
judicial determination of the merits of a tort claim. There
was a purpose in the retaining of this control by Congress since
it was against the policy of the Government to make itself
liable for any indefinite amount,' and general liability in tort
cases would mean absolute unpredictability since there is no
way of knowing what amount of tort claims will accrue in any
period. However, the method of handling the claims had out-
grown its usefulness and a more efficient way had to be sought.
Following the lead of many of the states, Congress passed the
Federal Tort Claims Act.
The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the immunity of the
United States from liability for the torts of its officers and
employees arising out of their employment, assumes liability
to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances, consents to have the liability determined by the courts,
or by administrative agencies if the claim is less than $1,000
at the choice of the claimant, submits to the law of the place
where the injury occurred, and confers jurisdiction on the
United States district court of the district wherein the plain-
tiff is resident or wherein the act or omission occurred to hear
and determine such claims of liability.
Administrative adjustment is provided in all cases where
the claim is $1,000 or less. The head of each Federal agency
is given authority to "consider, ascertain, adjust, determine,
and settle any claim against the United States for money only,
accruing on or after January 1, 1945, on account of damage to
"43 Stat. 112 (1925), 46 U.S.C.A. 781-790; 46 Stat. 1528 (1931) 28
U.S.C.A. 901.
"German Bank v. United States, Supra.
" angford v. United States (1879) 101 U.S. 341, 25 L.Ed. 1010.
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or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death,
* . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment." The liability of the United
States is to be the same as if it were a private party, and the
law to be applied is the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.
Any award made by a Federal Agency under this author-
ization is to be final and conclusive on all officers of the Gov-
ernment unless the award is procured by fraud. The award
is to be paid by the head of the Federal Agency concerned out
of appropriations that may be made therefor, and the act
authorizes such appropriations. The acceptance of any award
made operates as a complete release, both of the United States
and of the employee of the Government involved. In other
words, if a claimant recovers from the Government, he is pre-
cluded fron any action against the employee or official whose
act or omission gave rise to the claim by reason of the same
subject matter.
The act provides that the head of each Federal Agency
shall annually make a report to Congress of the claims paid
with name of claimant, amount asked and amount paid and a
brief description of the claim.
Part three of the act gives to the Federal district courts
the exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine and render judg-
ment on any claim, against the United States arising in the
same manner and being the same claims as described in part
two of the act except that in this section there is no limit as
to the amount of the claims. If the claim is for less than $1,000
there are two remedies, but if the claim exceeds that amount,
then it must be settled by the court. In hearing these claims,
the court sits without a jury and the claimant has no right
to a jury trial. In supplying a remedy where there was none,
the Congress may use its discretion as to whether to provide
a jury trial or not'5 and in this case has found it advisable to
leave the matter in the hands of the court, much as in equity
cases.
In keeping with well settled rules, the United States is
not liable for interest prior to judgment,' nor is it liable for
-60 Stat. 843 (1946) 28 U.S.C.A. 921.
"Tutun v. United States (1925) 270 U.S. 568, 46 S.Ct. 425, 70 L.Ed. 738.
"United States v. Goltra (1940) 312 U.S. 203, 61 S.Ct. 487, 85 L.Ed. 776;
Annotation 96 A.L.R. 30.
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punitive damages.' Costs, not including attorney's fees shall
be allowed to the successful claimant in all courts to the same
extent as if the United States were a private litigant.
A judgment under this act will be a complete bar to any
action against the employee of the Government whose act or
omission gave rise to the claim by reason of the same subject
matter, the same as an award by the Federal agency.
There are certain limitations on the institution of suits
under this section. It is provided that a suit may not be brought
on a claim that is before the Federal agency for administra-
tive determination. The claim may be brought to the court
after it has been withdrawn from the Federal agency by a
written notice given fifteen days prior to conmmencement of
the suit. Otherwise, once it has been submitted to the agency
for settlement, the claim may not be sued upon until it has
been finally disposed of by the agency. This will protect a
claimant from having a claim pigeon-holed by the agency to
which it is submitted, and all he need do is to give the agency
a written notice that he is withdrawing it and in fifteen days
he is free to start suit on it in the United States district court.
There is a further limitation on the institution of suit after a
claim has been submitted for administrative determination.
The suit may not be for an amount greater than that asked in
the claim submitted to the Federal agency, unless it is shown
that the increase is based on newly discovered evidence not
reasonably discoverable at the time of the presentation of the
claim to the Federal agency.
The forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions, and
the practice and procedure will be in accordance with the rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Act of
June 19, 1934; and the provisions for counterclaim and set-
off, interest on judgments, and payment of judgments are
the same as for actions brought in the United States district
court under the Tucker Act.
Judgments of the district court are final, subject to appeal.
The appeal may be to the circuit court of appeals in the same
manner and to the same extent as other judgments of the
district courts, or with the written consent of all the appellees,
it may be taken to the Court of Claims of the United States.
Such appeals to the Court of Claims of the United States
must be taken within three months after entry of the judg-
ment in the district court.
"160 Stat 84 (1946), 28 U.S.C.A. 931.
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At any time after institution of the suit, the Attorney
General has the authority to arbitrate, compromise or settle
any claim cognizable under part three of the act, with the ap-
proval of the court in which the suit is pending. In practice,
that will undoubtedly save considerable time and expense in
litigation and will make it possible to clear the calendar of
cases where there is no doubt of the validity and good faith
of the claim.
Where Congress provides a remedy, it may also make all
necessary limitations and restrictions on that remedy.' Con-
gress has provided a one year statute of limitations on the
presenting of the claim to the Federal agency in the case of
claims for less than $1,000, or the instituting of suit in the
district court. If the claim is taken to the Federal agency,
the claimant has six months from the time of mailing of the
notice of final disposition in which to institute a suit in the
district court in pursuance of part three of the act. The one
year is to be computed from the date of occurrence, or from
the enactment of the act, whichever is later.
While this act in general covers the nonfeasance, mis-
feasance and malfeasance of employees, there are several im-
portant exceptions. Claims arising out of loss, miscarriage or
negligent transmission of postal matters are excluded, as are
those resulting from assessment or collection of tax or customs
duties or the detention of goods by customs or excise officers
or by any other law enforcement officials. Other exemptions
include damage from the establishment of quarantines by the
United States, liability for damage to ships while passing
through the Panama Canal, regulation of the monetary system,
activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority, combatant ac-
tivities of the Armed Forces during time of war, and any
claims arising in a foreign country. Also exempt are any claims
arising out of assault, battery false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
These exceptions are of two classes. Those covered by other
specific acts and those in which the Government does not
wish to change the present rules of liability and immunity
from suit.
As part of any judgment rendered under the act, the
court may determine and allow reasonable attorney's fees, or
the head of the Federal agency may make such findings in
1Schillinger v. United States (1894) 155 U.S. 163, 166.
10
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case of administrative adjustment. These attorney's fees are
a part of the judgment and not in addition to the judgment,
award or settlement made. If the recovery is $500 or more,
the fee set shall not exceed 10 per cent of the amount re-
covered under administrative adjustment or 20 per cent of the
amount recovered in suit. A penalty is provided in case the
attorney charges a greater fee. He shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor and subject to a fine of not more than $2,000 and
imprisonment not to exceed one year, or both.
There have been other acts providing for administrative
adjustment of claims for property loss or damage or personal
injury or death as the result of certain acts." In so far as
these claims are now cognizable under part two of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the former acts are repealed. In other
words, this general act supersedes the other acts that dealt
with special cases and all claims that are included within the
new act will find their authorization there rather than in the
numerous other acts. This will do away with overlapping
remedies and will simplify and condense the statutes, which
is a desirable result.
In accordance with the act and the rules applicable, the
procedure will be simple and to the advantage of the attorney.
The suit can be filed in the United States district court and
service of summons be had on the local United States Attorney.
The usual rule, forms and procedure of the court will apply
with which the attorney is familiar. The new act should
prove advantageous to all parties concerned.
C. C. Cook
-42 Stat. 1066 (1922), 31 U.S.C.A. 215-217; 41 Stat. 929 (1920) 33
U.S.C.A. 853; 49 Stat. 1184 (1936) 31 U.S.C.A. 224b; 57 Stat. 372-373(1943) 31 U.S.C.A. 228b-223c; 40 Stat. 132 (1918) 34 U.S.C.A. 600; 42
Stat. 63 (1921) 31 U.S.C.A. 224c.
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